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Abstract
Every instance of the Stable Marriage Problem involves two finite sets of equal
size. We can think of one of the sets as containing men and the other as
containing women. Each person must rank the members of the opposite gender
in their order of preference. The goal is then to create a set of man-woman
couples with the following stability property: it is impossible to find a man
and a woman who prefer each other over their respective partners in the set
of couples. A set of couples having this property is called a stable matching.
Such matchings can be found using the Gale-Shapley algorithm. In this thesis,
we discuss the history of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. We also state and prove
some theorems which establish the most important properties of the algorithm.
We provide many examples in order to demonstrate how the algorithm works.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is a lot of history that leads up to the Gale-Shapley Algorithm. From
the early 1900’s up until 1945, the labor market for medical interns suffered
a Prisoner’s Dilemma problem in which there was a competition amongst
hospitals for interns. It was a race to hire medical students earlier and earlier
in their medical school career. There were many problems with how hospitals
were looking to get medical students.
For starters, hospitals had more positions open than the number of students graduating. This was a big reason for why hospitals would compete for
students. However, allowing students in earlier would be more expensive. The
hospital would not be aware of the student’s final grades in their courses and
thus the students could stop caring about their grades since they already had
a job. To fix this, it was agreed that student information would not be released
until a set date. In this way, all hospitals would be given a fair chance. By
1944, appointments for interviews would take place during a student’s junior
year.
Another issue was the waiting period between the time when offers of
internships were made and the time students were required to accept. If a
student was waitlisted at one’s first hospital choice, but accepted at one’s
second choice, one would wait to hear back from one’s first choice. Students
would be waiting too long to respond to hospitals.
The solution to this was students would have only 10 days to respond to
hospitals after being offered a position. However, while both of the above fixes
seemed like good solutions, it was quickly realized that it was not good enough
to ultimately fix the whole problem.
Thus, the solution was the trial-run algorithm. The students would rank
hospital programs in order of preference, which they applied to and hospitals
would rank their applicants. Both parties would submit these ranking to
a bureau, which would then use this information to arrange a matching of
students to hospitals and inform the parties of the results. Thus a specific
algorithm was proposed to produce a matching from the submitted ranks.
This ultimately became known as the National Intern Matching Program in
1953.
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Many years later it was discovered that this was essentially the GaleShapley algorithm, which was published in 1962 [1]. The only difference is
that the latter finds an optimal matching for the hospital rather than the residents. We know from the Gale-Shapley algorithm, that there will exist at
least one stable matching in an instance of the stable marriage problem. This
algorithm always finds a stable matching.
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Chapter 2
Definitions and Examples
In this chapter a few important key definitions to better understand the Stable
M arriage P roblem will be given. I will provide an example for each definition
in order to better comprehend what the definition is stating. I will also include
a few theorems which will be proven in Chapter 4.
Definition 1. An instance of the Stable Marriage Problem of size n involves
two disjoint sets, one containing n men and the other containing n women.
Each man and each woman has a strictly ordered preference list, ranking all
of the people of the opposite sex. We say that person p prefers q to r (q and
r are of the opposite sex from p) if q is ranked higher than r on p’s preference
list.
Example 1. Consider the situation where the set of men is
{Cole, Jack, Ken, Larry} ,
and the set of women is
{Gail, Heather, Jane, M aggie} .
Preference lists for men and women are given in the two tables below.
Cole

Jack

Ken

Larry

Gail

Heather

Jane

Maggie

Heather

Gail

Gail

Maggie

Cole

Jack

Ken

Ken

Jane

Jane

Maggie

Heather

Larry

Cole

Jack

Larry

Maggie

Heather

Jane

Gail

Ken

Larry

Larry

Jack

Gail

Maggie

Heather

Jane

Jack

Ken

Cole

Cole

Table 2.1: Men’s Preferences

Table 2.2: Women’s Preferences

We see that Cole’s first choice is Heather, his second choice is Jane, his
third is Maggie, and his fourth is Gail. The preferences of the others are read
in the same way.
The above is an instance of the Stable Marriage Problem of size 4.
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Definition 2. A matching for an instance of the stable marriage problem of
size n is a set M consisting of exactly n man-woman pairs (m, w), with each
man appearing in exactly one pair, and likewise for each woman. If man m
and woman w are matched in M , then m and w are called partners in M ,
and we write m = PM (w), w = PM (m). Thus, PM (m) is the M -partner of m,
and PM (w) the M -partner of w.
Example 2. Looking back at Example 1, one matching would be
{(Cole, Heather), (Jack, Gail), (Ken, M aggie), (Larry, Jane)}.
Definition 3. Suppose that M is a matching for an instance of the stable
marriage problem. A blocking pair for M consists of a man m and woman w
such that m and w are not partners in M , but m prefers w to PM (m) and w
prefers m to PM (w). We say that M is stable if there is no blocking pair for
M.
The basic problem we address in the thesis is the following:
For each instance of the Stable Marriage Problem, is it possible to
find a stable matching?
In Chapter 3, we answer the above question in the affirmative. A procedure
called the Gale-Shapley Algorithm will be presented and used to find stable
matchings.
Determining whether or not a given matching M is stable turns out to be
easy. We simply check each member of one of the genders to see if that person
can belong to a blocking pair. Suppose that we check the men. Then for each
man m we look to see if any woman w he prefers to PM (m) also prefers him
to PM (w).
Example 3. Referring back to Example 1, the matching
{(Cole, Heather), (Jack, Gail), (Ken, M aggie), (Larry, Jane)}
is not stable because Gail prefers Ken over Jack and Ken’s first choice was
also Gail. Therefore (Ken, Gail) is a blocking pair for the matching.
Definition 4. A man m and woman w are said to form a stable pair if m
and w are partners in some stable matching. If m and w form a stable pair,
we also say that m and w are stable partners of each other.
Example 4. Referring back to Example 1, a stable matching would be
{(Cole, Heather), (Jack, Jane), (Ken, Gail), (Larry, M aggie)}
This is a stable matching, because there are no blocking pairs.
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Definition 5. A stable matching is said to be man-optimal if every man is
paired with his favorite stable partner. Similarly a woman-optimal matching
occurs when every woman is paired with her favorite stable partner. We will
always denote a man-optimal stable matching by M0 and women-optimal by
Mz .
We prove the existence of man-optimal and woman-optimal matchings in
Chapter 4.
Example 5. Refer to the two tables below:
Joe

Derek

Zack

Dave

Beatrice

Judy

Karen Penny

Karen

Judy

Penny

Beatrice

Derek

Zack

Dave

Joe

Judy

Karen

Beatrice

Penny

Joe

Joe

Derek

Zack

Penny

Penny

Karen

Judy

Dave

Dave

Joe

Derek

Judy

Karen

Zack

Derek

Zack

Dave

Beatrice Beatrice

Table 2.3: Men’s Preferences

Table 2.4: Women’s Preferences

For the instance of the Stable Marriage Problem described by the above tables,
man-optimal and woman-optimal matchings are given below:
M0 = {(Joe, Karen), (Derek, Judy), (Zack, P enny), (Dave, Beatrice)}
Mz = {(Joe, P enny), (Derek, Beatrice), (Zack, Judy), (Dave, Karen)}
Notice, in M0 every man is paired with his first choice, and likewise every
woman is paired with her first choice in Mz . We cannot expect that this will
always occur, as the example below shows.
Example 6. The two tables below show another instance of the Stable Marriage Problem.
Steve

Will

Anthony

Donald

Olivia

Ava

Emma

Ava

Ava

Harper

Will

Steve

Harper

Harper

Olivia

Ava

Donald

Donald

Will

Steve

Ava

Emma

Emma

Olivia

Steve

Anthony

Donald

Will

Olivia

Olivia

Harper

Emma

Anthony

Will

Steve

Donald

Table 2.5: Men’s Preferences

Harper

Emma

Anthony Anthony

Table 2.6: Woman’s Preferences

Carrying out the Gale-Shapley algorithm (which we describe in the next chapter), we obtain the following matchings:
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M0 = {(Steve, Emma), (W ill, Harper), (Anthony, Olivia), (Donald, Ava)}
Mz = {(Steve, Ava), (W ill, Harper), (Anthony, Emma), (Donald, Olivia)}
We see that some individuals end up with their first choice, but not everyone
does.
Example 7. In this example, we discuss the College Admissions Problem. A
college is considering a set of n applicants of which it can admit a quota of
only q. The admissions office evaluates the qualifications of the applicants and
decides which ones to admit. Offering only the q best qualified applicants will
most likely not work, because it cannot be assumed that all who are offered
admission will accept. For a college to receive q acceptances, it will have to
offer admission to more than q applicants. This creates some issues because
there are many factors that are unknown. The colleges are unaware of whether
the applicants have applied elsewhere, how they rank their colleges and which
other colleges are offering them admission. Due to all this uncertainty, colleges
can only expect that the entering class will be close to the desired quota.
The usual admissions procedure not only creates problems for the colleges,
but for the students as well. For example, asking an applicant to put one’s
order of colleges in a preference list could affect what college one gets into. A
college might see that it is the third choice on the preference list and this could
hurt one’s chances of even getting into the college. A solution that was offered
is the “waiting list.” Applicants are informed that they are not admitted into
the college at the time, but may gain admission later. However, this solution
itself still has some problems. Students must decide if they want to wait for
the college to respond to see if they will get admitted later on or if they should
just accept another college that has already offered acceptance.
An alternate approach to the above would be to proceed as follows. Each
applicant would be required to make a preference list in which the colleges
are ranked in order of preference, excluding colleges he or she would never
accept. Similarly, the colleges would rank the applicants in order of preference,
excluding those whom they would never accept. The goal would then be to
find an assignment of applicants to colleges which is stable in the following
sense: it is impossible to find an applicant x and a college y such that x is
unassigned or prefers y to the college he or she is assigned to, and y has an
opening or prefers x to one of the applicants who have been assigned to y. Thus
the problem becomes a generalized version of the Stable Marriage Problem.
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Chapter 3
Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Gale’s and Shapley’s results show that in every instance of the stable
marriage problem there exists at least one stable matching. They did so by
giving an algorithm that is guaranteed to find such a matching. They showed
that their algorithm finds a stable matching that simultaneously gives all men
(or women, if the gender roles are reversed) the best possible partner that they
can have in any stable matching.
The algorithm can be expressed as a sequence of “proposals” from men to
women. Through the execution, each person is either engaged or free; the man
can be free or engaged. However, once a woman is engaged, she can no longer
be free again. That does not mean that her fiancé’s marital status cannot
change. A man who is engaged more than once obtains fiancées who are less
desirable to him, while each engagement brings the woman to a more favorable
partner.
A free woman must accept the first proposal she receives and becomes
engaged to whoever proposes to her. When an engaged woman is proposed to,
she compares the proposer and her current fiancé, then rejects the one she finds
less desirable. If she becomes engaged with the new proposer, her ex partner
will now be free again. Each man proposes to the woman on his preference list
in order of appearance until he becomes engaged and the algorithm terminates
when everyone is engaged.
Each man proposes to the women on his preference list, in the order in
which they appear. He does this until he becomes engaged. However, if a
woman decides to break off the engagement, he becomes free again. When
this happens, he goes back to his sequences of proposals and proposes to the
next woman. The algorithm terminates when everyone is engaged. Upon
termination, the engaged couples form a stable matching. This will be proved
in Chapter 4. We denote the set of all men by M and the set of all women by
W . Below we give the basic Gale-Shapley algorithm, in pseudocode form.
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assign each person to be free.
while some m is free do
begin
w := the first woman on m’s list to whom m has not yet proposed ;
if w is free then
assign m and w to be engaged { to each other }
else
if w prefers m to her fiancé m0 then
assign m and w to be engaged and m0 to be free
else
w rejects m and m remains free
end ; output the stable matching of the n engaged pairs
The above is taken from [2]. Since the order in which the free men propose
is not specified, the algorithm has an element of nondeterminism. Later on, in
Chapter 4, we will see that the nondeterminism is not a problem. The order
in which the free men propose does not affect the outcome. We will prove that
the above algorithm terminates and yields a stable matching in Chapter 4 (see
Theorem 1).
1
3
2
1
4

2
3
4
1
2

3
1
4
2
3

4
2
1
4
3

1
1
4
3
2

Table 3.1: Men’s Preferences

2
2
3
4
1

3
1
3
2
4

4
4
1
2
3

Table 3.2: Women’s Preferences

Example 8. Consider the instance of the Stable Marriage Problem described
by Tables 3.1 and 3.2. A possible execution of the algorithm results in the
following sequence of proposals: man 1 to woman 3 (accepted); man 2 to
woman 3 (not accepted); man 3 to woman 1 (accepted); man 4 to woman 2
(accepted). Based off this, woman 4 does not have a match which means there
is something wrong. As one can see, women 3 was proposed to twice. We
have to view woman 3’s list to see who she prefers out of the two men. Her
first choice is man 1, therefore, she stays with man 1. Then we view man 2’s
second choice which is woman 4. Woman 4 has not yet been proposed to so
her match will be with man 2. Thus, the stable matching generated by the
man-oriented version of the algorithm is {(1, 3), (2, 4), (3, 1), (4, 2)}.
All possible executions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm (men being the proposers) lead to the same stable matching and every man obtains from it the
best partner that he can possibly have in any stable matching. This follows
from Theorem 2 in Chapter 4. Although the men are competing for the women,
they can all agree on a stable matching that is optimal for all of them.
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Notice that, according to Theorem 2, if each man is independently given
his best stable partner, then the result is a stable matching. This is surprising, because there is no prior reason as to why this should even be a
matching. The stable matchings that we attain by the man-oriented version
of the Gale-Shapley algorithm are man-optimal (recall Definition 5). If the
roles are changed and we apply the woman-oriented version of the algorithm,
then we obtain the woman-optimal stable matching. In some cases, the man
and woman-optimal stable matchings will be identical, but in general, they
will not be. As before, we will denote the man-optimal stable matching by M0
and the woman-optimal by Mz .
When each man ends up with his best stable partner, it is no surprise that
this comes with some sort of consequence. However, it is the opposite gender
that faces the problem. In the man-optimal stable matching, each woman
has the worst possible partner that she can have in any stable matching (see
Theorem 3 in Chapter 4). Therefore, a man-optimal matching is also woman“pessimal” (the term for each woman ending up with worst possible stable
partner); likewise the woman-optimal stable matching is man-pessimal.
Example 9. Consider the situation described by Tables 3.3 and 3.4
1
1
2
3
4

2
3
4
1
2

3
2
4
1
3

4
4
1
2
3

1
2
4
3
1

Table 3.3: Men’s Preferences

2
1
3
4
2

3
4
2
1
3

4
3
1
2
4

Table 3.4: Women’s Preferences

If we apply the Gale-Shapley algorithm with men and then women as proposers, we obtain the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings below:
M0 = {(1, 1), (2, 3), (3, 2), (4, 4)}
and
Mz = {(1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 4), (4, 2)}.

Definition 6. If the Gale-Shapley algorithm is being carried out with the
men doing the proposing, then we call this the man-oriented version of the
algorithm. Likewise, when women are doing the proposing, we call this the
woman-oriented version.
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We will see in Chapter 4 that the man-oriented version of the algorithm leads
to a man-optimal stable matching, and the woman-oriented version leads to a
woman-optimal stable matching.
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Chapter 4
Theorems and Proofs
In this chapter, I will provide proofs of the theorems that were discussed in
earlier chapters. When the man-oriented version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm
is executed, each man proposes to the women on his preference list, starting
with his first choice. He does this until he is engaged. If a woman breaks
the engagement, then he is free again. He begins the sequence of proposals
again starting with the next woman on his preference list. The algorithm will
terminate when everyone is engaged. It turns out that the order in which the
free men propose does not determine the outcome. We will now show that
upon termination, the engaged couples form a stable matching.
Theorem 1. In any given instance of the stable marriage problem, the GaleShapley Algorithm terminates and once it terminates, the engaged pairs form
a stable matching.
Proof. We use contradiction to prove that no man can be rejected by all
women. Assume that a man can in fact be rejected by all women. Once
a woman is engaged, she can no longer be free again (although she can become engaged to a different man). Therefore the only way a woman can reject
a proposal is if she’s already engaged. It follows that if a man is rejected by
the last woman on his list, then all of the women have already been engaged.
However, there are an equal number of men and women, and no man can have
two partners. Thus, all of the men would have also been engaged, a contradiction. No man can propose to the same woman twice. Hence, the total number
of proposals cannot exceed n2 (in a case involving n men and n women). We
conclude that the algorithm does terminate.
After termination, the engaged pairs form a matching, which we denote by
M . If man m prefers woman w to PM (m), then w must have rejected m at
some point. This means that w was, either at the time of m’s proposal or at
some later time, engaged to a man she prefers to m. Any further changes in
w’s engagement status will result in an even better partner. Thus, w cannot
prefer m to PM (w) and (m, w) cannot block M . This means that the matching
M is stable.
Recall, the concept of stable partner was introduced in Definition 4.
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As we have mentioned before, all executions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm
lead to the same stable matching. This stable matching has the property that
every man ends up with his best possible stable partner, as we prove below.
Theorem 2. After any execution of the man-oriented version of the GaleShapley algorithm, every man is paired with his favorite stable partner.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that some execution E of the GaleShapley algorithm results in a matching M with some man m not paired with
his favorite stable partner. Then, in some other stable matching M 0 , man m
is paired with a woman he likes more than his partner in M . Let’s denote m’s
partners in M and M 0 by w and w0 , respectively. Recall, in any execution of
the Gale Shapley algorithm, each man proposes first to the woman he likes
best. If he is rejected, then he just proposes to the women he likes second best,
and so on. Since m winds up with w in M , and not with w0 , it follows that
w0 rejected m at some point during E. We may assume that this was the first
time during E that a man was rejected by a stable partner. Now, w0 rejected
m for someone else; let’s call him m0 . Since w0 rejected m for m0 , it must be
the case that w0 prefers m0 over m.
We claim that w0 is the favorite stable partner of m0 . To see this, we assume
for a contradiction that the favorite stable partner of m0 is a different woman,
let’s call her w00 . Observe that m0 must have proposed to w00 during E before
he proposed to w0 (since he prefers w00 to w). Furthermore, he must have
been rejected by w00 at some point (if not, he would have never proposed to
w0 ). Thus during E, m0 is rejected by w00 before he proposes to w0 . However,
recall that m is rejected by w0 because of the engagement of w0 with m0 . This
means that m is rejected by w0 after m0 is rejected by w00 . This contradicts
our assumption that the rejection of m by w0 is the first time during E that a
man is rejected by a stable partner. The claim is established.
So now we have that w0 prefers m0 over m and m0 prefers w0 over all of
his other stable partners. This means that the pair (m0 , w0 ) blocks M 0 . But
M 0 was suppose to be stable. This contradiction completes the proof of the
theorem.
The above theorem implies that if each man is independently given his best
stable partner, then the result is a stable matching.
Having examined the output of the man-oriented version of the GaleShapley algorithm from the perspective of the men, we now consider just
how good the output is for the women. Before reading the theorem and proof
below, the reader may wish to review Definition 5 in Chapter 2.
Theorem 3. In the man-optimal stable matching, each woman has the worst
possible partner that she can have in any stable matching.
Proof. As always, we denote the man-optimal stable matching by M0 . We are
going to prove this theorem by contradiction. Assume that there is a woman
w whose partner in M0 is not her least favorite stable partner. This means
14

that there exists a stable matching M 0 such that w prefers her partner in M0
over her partner in M 0 . We represent w’s partner in M0 and M 0 as m and m0 ,
respectively. Based off of this, we have that m can’t have the same partner
in M 0 that he has in M0 ; let’s denote his partner in M 0 by w0 . Since m is
paired with w in the man-optimal matching, then m must prefer w to w0 . It
now follows that M 0 is blocked by (m, w). This contradicts the fact that M 0
is stable.
The man-optimal (and woman-optimal) stable matchings turn out to exhibit another interesting kind of optimality, which we describe in the theorem
below.
Theorem 4. For any instance of the stable marriage problem, there is no
matching, stable or otherwise, in which every man has a partner whom he
strictly prefers to his partner in the man-optimal stable matching M0 .
Proof. Clearly, there cannot be any stable matching with the property that
was just stated. We will prove this by using contradiction. Therefore, we
assume that there exists an unstable matching M 0 with this property. During
an execution of the man-oriented Gale-Shapley algorithm, if w is the last
woman to become engaged then no man was rejected by w, since the algorithm
terminates when the last woman receives her first proposal. But if w’s partners
in M0 and M 0 are m and m0 respectively, then m0 prefers w to his partner in
M0 , so w must have rejected m0 . Thus, a contraction.
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Chapter 5
Examples
In this chapter, we will carry out the Gale-Shapley algorithm using different
versions of the algorithm (man-oriented vs woman-oriented). In some of the
examples, we give a detailed description of how the algorithm proceeds when
there are rejections.
Carl

Ethan

Jon

Ryan

Addison

Grace

Madison

Riley

Grace

Madison

Addison

Riley

Ethan

Ethan

Jon

Ryan

Madison

Addison

Riley

Grace

Carl

Jon

Carl

Ethan

Riley

Grace

Madison

Addison

Ryan

Carl

Ethan

Jon

Addison

Riley

Grace

Madison

Jon

Ryan

Ryan

Carl

Table 5.1: Men’s Preferences

Table 5.2: Women’s Preferences

We read the table as follows: Carl’s first choice is Grace, his second choice is
Madison, his third is Riley and his fourth is Addison. The preferences of the
others are read in the same way.
A possible execution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm results in the following
sequences of proposals: Carl to Grace (accepted); Ethan to Madison (accepted); Jon to Addison (accepted); Ryan to Riley (accepted). Thus, the
stable matching generated by the man-oriented version of the algorithm is
{(Carl, Grace), (Ethan, M adison), (Jon, Addison), (Ryan, Riley}.

Note that in this example, every man ends up with his first choice. This of
course cannot happen in situations where the same woman is listed first by
two or more men.
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Bill

Clint

Kevin

Ron

Anna

Jane

Sally

Tammy

Sally

Tammy

Sally

Anna

Clint

Kevin

Bill

Ron

Anna

Anna

Jane

Sally

Bill

Ron

Ron

Bill

Jane

Sally

Tammy

Tammy

Ron

Bill

Kevin

Clint

Tammy

Jane

Anna

Jane

Kevin

Clint

Clint

Kevin

Table 5.3: Men’s Preferences

Table 5.4: Women’s Preferences

For the situation described by Tables 5.3 and 5.4, a possible execution of the
Gale-Shapley algorithm results in the following sequences of proposals: Bill to
Sally (accepted); Clint to Tammy (accepted); Kevin to Sally (not accepted);
Kevin to Jane (accepted); Ron to Anna (accepted). Kevin and Sally were not
paired together because Sally’s first choice was Bill. Thus, the stable matching
generated by the man-oriented version of the algorithm is
{(Bill, Sally), (Clint, T ammy), (Kevin, Jane), (Ron, Anna)}.
Note that this matching is man-optimal, by Theorem 2.

Dave

Frank

Greg

Hank

Luke

Maria

Erica

Kasey

Nancy Nancy

Erica

Irene

Erica

Maria

Irene

Kasey

Kasey

Nancy

Irene

Maria

Irene

Maria

Maria

Erica

Kasey

Nancy Nancy

Irene

Kasey

Erica

Table 5.5: Men’s Preferences
Erica

Irene

Kasey Maria Nancy

Hank

Dave

Frank

Hank

Frank

Frank

Luke

Dave

Dave

Greg

Luke

Greg

Greg

Luke

Dave

Dave

Frank

Luke

Greg

Luke

Greg

Hank

Hank

Frank

Hank

Table 5.6: Women’s Preferences
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For the situation described by Tables 5.5 and 5.6, a possible execution of the
woman-oriented version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm results in the following
sequence: Erica to Hank (accepted); Irene to Dave (accepted); Kasey to Frank
(accepted); Maria to Hank (accepted); Erica to Frank(accepted); Kasey to
Dave(accepted); Irene to Luke (accepted); Nancy to Frank (not accepted);
Nancy to Greg (accepted).When Maria proposes to Hank, we take a look at
Hank’s preference list and see that he prefers Maria over Erica so he breaks
off his engagement with Erica and goes with Maria. Now we go back to Erica
who must propose to her second choice. She proposes to Frank who is already
engaged to Kasey. However, Frank prefers Erica to Kasey so he leaves Kasey to
be with Erica. Then Kasey is single again and proposes to her second choice,
Dave. Dave must accept her proposal, because he has not yet been proposed
to. Next, Nancy proposes to Frank, but Frank prefers Erica over Nancy so he
stays with Erica. Then Nancy proposes to her second choice Greg, who must
accept because he is unengaged. Thus, the stable matching generated by the
woman-oriented version of the algorithm is
{(Dave, Kasey), (F rank, Erica), (Greg, N ancy), (Hank, M aria), (Luke, Irene)}.
This matching is woman-optimal.

Brian

Dan

Larry

Rob

Fran

Fran

Fran

Taylor

Leslie

Leslie

Taylor

June

June

Rob

June

June

Fran

Fran

Taylor

Leslie

Leslie

Taylor

June

Brian Brian

Table 5.7: Men’s Preferences

Leslie Taylor
Dan

Rob

Larry

Brian

Larry

Larry

Rob

Larry

Dan

Dan

Dan

Rob

Brian

Table 5.8: Women’s Preferences

Consider now the situation described by Tables 5.7 and 5.8. A possible execution of the man-oriented version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm results in
the following sequence of proposals: Brian to Fran (accepted); Dan to Fran
(not accepted); Dan to Taylor (accepted); Larry to Taylor (accepted); Dan
to June (accepted); Rob to Leslie (accepted). Dan proposes to Fran, but she
rejects her proposal, because her first choice is Brian. Then Dan proposes to
Taylor who has not been proposed to yet so she accepts his proposal. However,
right after that, Larry proposes to Taylor and Taylor prefers Larry over Dan.
Therefore she leaves her engagement with Dan to be engaged to Larry. Dan
is once again single and must propose to his next choice. His third choice is
June. June is single so she accepts Dan’s proposal. No other rejections occur
throughout the rest of the algorithm. Thus, the stable matching generated by
the man-oriented version of the algorithm is
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{(Brian, F ran), (Dan, June), (Larry, T aylor), (Rob, Leslie)}.
A possible execution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm using the woman-oriented
version results in the following sequence of proposals: Fran to Brian (accepted);
June to Brian (not accepted); June to Larry (accepted); Leslie to Dan (accepted); Taylor to Rob (accepted). When June proposes to Brian, he turns
down her proposal, because he prefers Fran to June. Therefore, June must
ask her second choice, which is Larry. Larry has not been proposed to yet so
he must accept her proposal. No other rejections occur throughout the rest of
the algorithm. Thus, the stable matching generated by the woman-oriented
version of the algorithm is
{(Brian, F ran), (Dan, Leslie), (Larry, June), (Rob, T aylor)}.
After carrying out the two different versions of the algorithm, we see that the
results vary. The only couple that remains together is Brian and Fran. This
occurs because they are both each other’s first choice.

Doug

James

Liam

Noah

Lily

Mia

Sophia

Zoe

Mia

Sophia

Zoe

Zoe

Noah

Doug

Liam

Doug

Sophia

Zoe

Lily

Lily

Liam

James

James

James

Lily

Lily

James

Liam

Doug

Liam

Zoe

Mia

Doug

Noah

Noah

Noah

Sophia Sophia
Mia

Mia

Table 5.9: Men’s Preferences

Table 5.10: Women’s Preferences

For the situation described by the above two tables, we will show two possible
executions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. One will be a man-oriented version
and the other will be a woman-oriented version. Then we will compare the
outcomes.
A possible execution of the algorithm using the man-oriented version results
in the following sequence of proposals: Doug to Mia (accept); James to Sophia
(accept); Liam to Zoe (accept); Noah to Zoe (not accept); Noah to Lily (accept). Zoe prefers Liam to Noah therefore she will stay with Liam. Thus, the
stable matching generated by the man-oriented version of the algorithm is
{(Doug, M ia), (James, Sophia), (Liam, Zoe), (N oah, Lily)}.
19

A possible execution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm using the woman-oriented
version results in the following sequence of proposals: Lily to Noah (accept);
Mia to Doug (accept); Sophia to Liam (accept); Zoe to Doug (not accept),
Zoe to James (accept). Doug prefers Mia over Zoe so Zoe must ask her second
choice. She proposes to James, who is single, and is now engaged to James.
Thus, the stable matching generated by the woman-oriented version of the
algorithm is
{(Doug, M ia), (James, Zoe), (Liam, Sophia), (N oah, Lily)}.
While two couples did not change from the previous matching, James and
Liam switched partners with Zoe and Sophia.
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